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T O S H I B A IN T H E U.K. 
Malcolm T R E V O R 
The background 
Toshiba set up its first British operation in 1973. This was a 
sales and distribution company which, under the regulations in 
force at the time, was allocated a quota to sell 20,000 imported 
Japanese TV sets a year in the British market. 
In order to expand its market share and the scope of its 
British operations, the company then entered into a joint 
venture in November 1978 with the Rank Organisation to 
produce television sets at Rank's existing facilities in the West 
of England, with assembly centred on the factory at Plymouth. 
Toshiba invested £ 3 million and a production target of 350,000 
sets a year was set. 
In fact the nearest to the target that the joint venture was 
able to get was 270,000 sets a year. Toshiba's shareholding was 
no more than 30 per cent but it was said to have a degree of 
influence over company organisation and management - and it 
also appointed the chairman. However, the failure to reach the 
production target was disappointing and the joint venture was 
losing money. It was therefore agreed by mutual consent to 
dissolve it and what had been Rank's entire television and TV 
sub-assembly production at four factories in Devon and 
Cornwall was completely closed down in March 1981. 
The entire workforce was discharged. Rank had to write off 
£ 18.8 million and bear 70 per cent of the joint venture's losses. 
In the local economy, which was already suffering from 
recession and in which there were hardly any other employment 
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opportunities, the closure produced widespread gloom - but 
also acted as a stimulus, as the crisis impelled local politicians 
and trade union leaders to try and persuade Toshiba to take 
over the venture on a wholly-owned basis. The company was 
assured of a friendly welcome. 
The reasons for the failure of the joint venture have been 
variously discusses and it is not without interest that another 
joint venture in the same industry, GEC-Hitachi, which had 
started just before Rank-Toshiba, also encountered problems 
and eventually sought the same type of solution : in this case a 
takeover by Hitachi in 1984. But in spite of the apparent 
similarities, the cases of the two companies were not identical, 
though in both instances it would probably be fair to say that 
neither joint venture succeeded in making the best use of the 
Japanese partner's engineering and organisational expertise. 
At first it was not certain whether Toshiba would be 
interested in taking over from Rank and there was very careful 
scrutiny of the local situation and then of the figures in the 
business plan before the company's Board in Japan decided to 
go ahead. There was a determination on all sides that 
everything had to be done to turn what had been the previous 
failure into success. The Financial Times , for instance, saw it as 
a case of Toshiba 'taking on a salvage mission' out of the 
'wreckage' of the old company and this was scarcely an 
exageration. The Plymouth factory had originally opened in 
1948 and the crisis meant that the point had been reached where 
major changes, and not just ad hoc attempts to patch up the 
system, were needed 1. 
Starting the new company 
People who had seen the success of other Japanese 
manufacturing operations in Britain thought that Toshiba, in 
sole control of a wholly-owned operation, would be free to 
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innovate, organise and manage according to its own ideas and 
that it would be similarly successful. After the traumatic 
experience of the closure of the old company, the local staff 
were likewise convinced that the time for change had come. 
It needs to be emphasised how thoroughgoing this change 
was. The first thing was the change in the structure of the 
operation itself, which was expressed in Figure 1 below 
following the diagram prepared by the company for public 
presentations. 
Figure 1. Organisational change : Rank-Toshiba joint venture to 
Toshiba Consumer Products (UK) Ltd. 
R a n k - T o s h i b a L t d 
Source: TCP. 
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The second thing was the new integrated concept 
underlying the marketing and production system - which might 
be compared with that of the traditional type of bespoke tailor, 
who only makes a suit when the customer has ordered it. In the 
days of the old company, coordination between sales and 
production seemed to have been poor and there were stories of 
quantities of unsold sets piling up in the warehouse; with all the 
cost and waste that this implies. Under the new system, sets are 
only produced at Plymouth when the sales company has already 
rece ived an order. The Manag ing Di rec tor of the 
manufacturing company at Plymouth sits on the Board of the 
marketing company near London and there is continual close 
liaison between the two. The aim is the type of integrated 
marketing and production system found at Toshiba and other 
companies in Japan, which can also be characterised as a 
'logistic chain' as in Figure 2 below. 
Figure 2. Integrated marketing and production system, or 'logistic 
chain' 
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What can not be represented in the diagram is the dynamic 
character of the new system, which now typifies the automobile 
industry and many others in Japan. Marketing people, for 
example , constant ly feed information to design and 
development, who in turn work closely with production 
engineering people to ensure that good sales ideas do not 
become production disasters. In British companies there have 
been too many instances of production managers who have not 
been involved at all at the design and development stage simply 
being told to put new products into production that, however 
briliant as sales ideas, create severe production difficulties. The 
idea of the continuous 'logistic chain' is not merely to avoid such 
problems but, more positively, to promote continual product 
development and to bring new products on to the market ahead 
of competitors 2. 
As far as the Plymouth factory was concerned, one of the 
biggest changes on the production side, which had major 
organisational implications, as the change from Rank's policy 
of making so many of the sub-assemblies and parts itself at its 
various factories in Devon and Cornwall, to Toshiba's policy of 
concentrating on the production of the final product. This was a 
policy that closely reflected the situation in Japan, where 
manufacturers like Toshiba can rely on outside suppliers to 
deliver good quality parts on time 3 . The aim at Plymouth was to 
achieve "a high standard from day one" and to run "a clockwork 
factory, with no surprises good or bad". But the most important 
means of doing this was through organisation : not through 
technology. From the point of view of technology, the 
difference between the new company and the old was not so 
much one of technology per se as one of a rearranged and more 
logical layout, with different working practices, consistent with 
the concentration of manufacturing at the one site at Plymouth, 
in contrast to the previous attempt to do everything in-house. 
This is an important point for those who mistakenly believe that 
Japanese successes in manufacturing automatically grow out of 
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the latest technology. Factory visits in Japan show that not all 
the equipment in use is by any means the latest but that what 
makes the difference is the determination to use it to the best 
advantage; in other words, management. 
The new management approach 
It was decided that all those who had worked in the old 
company would be eligible to apply for jobs in the new one and 
nine hundred people applied for the three hundred jobs that 
were available. Of those taken on, all except one had worked in 
the old company. They went through an extremely careful 
selection and screening process, during which they were shown 
a videotape made by the new Managing Director, Geoffrey 
Deith, explaining what sort of company Toshiba was and what 
would be expected. The tape emphasised points such as 
punctuality, attendance, quality and flexibility : all points that 
are of great importance in Japan but which can not simply be 
said to be 'Japanese'. Here it needs to be borne in mind that the 
Plymouth company has now added a new division and a new 
factory producing microwave ovens, and that it now employs 
nearly 1,200 people; so that those who remain of the original 
three hundred who started work at the reorganised factory in 
May 1981 are outnumbered by those, many of them young, who 
have since joined the company. 
It is sometimes supposed by people without any first hand 
experience of the company at Plymouth that because Toshiba is 
Japanese-owned, therefore its new approach must be 
'Japanese' but this is an over-simplification. Japanese firms 
operating in Europe, like European firms operating in Japan, 
know that they must to some extent modify their approach in 
order not to conflict with the local environment. Depending on 
factors such as the product market, the type of workforce, local 
employment and industrial relations legislation etc, managers 
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must decide at what point along the continuum running from 
'Japanese' to 'European' they are going to make their 
compromise. Their decision is crucial because if they get it 
wrong the company will be likely to face problems that will 
reduce its operating efficiency. Many Japanese managers worry 
that if they make too many compromises the company will lose 
its competitive edge. Others, on the other hand, hesitate to 
int roduce ' Japanese ' pract ices because of, somet imes 
exaggerated, fears that they will not be acceptable locally due 
to the local 'culture'; although it has to be said that many 
Japanese companies do not prepare their managers very 
thoroughly for overseas assignments, so that they may have 
rather stereotyped ideas of the local society. While it can not be 
claimed that there is some simple formula, like the recipe for a 
cake, that can be applied to the management of Japanese 
companies in Europe, there are companies that have been 
successful in aiming for a blend of those home country and host 
country practices that together produce the most competitive 
result in the local setting. 
As far as Toshiba at Plymouth was concerned, there was a 
definite meeting of minds and a high degree of trust between 
the top British and Japanese management, without which even 
the design, not to mention the implementation, of the new 
approach would have been difficult. Before the start up of the 
new company there were exhaustive and free-ranging 
discussions of how the new approach 'from day one' should 
operate, bearing in mind the initial target of producing 100,000 
TV sets a year with 300 people. Those taking part in the 
discussions comprised the new management team of Geoffrey 
Deith, the Managing Director, Mr. K. Komada, the senior 
Japanese engineering manager, since promoted to take charge 
of the TV Division at the parent plant in Japan, and five senior 
British managers. The meeting of minds came about because the 
local management, particularly after the crisis with the joint 
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venture, and the Japanese management were converging from 
different starting points on similar solutions. 
Geoffrey Deith especially, who played a key role in 
formulating the new approach, persuading the Board in Japan 
that it was workable and implementing it once it had been 
agreed, had many years previously become interested in new 
approaches to management. This was through his acquaintance 
with the case of the Glacier Metal Company, whose 
innovations in the Britain of the late 1940s had made it a 
seminal object of study 4. Glacier was famous for its system of 
representatives elected from all levels of the organisation and 
from all departments, together forming an advisory council, 
and at an audio company where he had previously been. 
Managing Director Deith had tried out a similar participatory 
system for a considerable number of years. He therefore knew 
the possibilities and problems from experience and with the 
closure of the joint venture and the takeover by Toshiba he saw 
the chance of putting forward his ideas to a receptive Japanese 
management and took the opportunity with enthusiasm. Like 
the Japanese, he believed in 'working together with a common 
purpose', though, like the Japanese again, on a practical and 
not on an overly idealised basis. By training, he was himself an 
engineer and familiar with the realities of production 
management. 
The new approach was a conscious attempt to implement 
an integrated management system, made up of different 
elements. These elements can be identified separately for 
purposes of analysis but the system can only work as intended 
when they fit together, like the meshing of gear wheels. The 
elements of the structure of the organisation and of the 
integration of marketing and production have been briefly 
out l ined above. To these were added the personnel 
management and employee relations systems, including the 
representative system. Seen as a whole, this integrated 
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approach amounted to a 'package', in which the various 
elements were consciously intended to be consistent with one 
another and to be mutual ly reinforcing. Indeed the 
management team discussions about the design of the systems 
was itself an integral part of the approach : in contrast to 
companies where new systems would have been simply 
imposed from above without discussion. It as perhaps 
inevitable that the news media, with their need to find the most 
newsworthy 'story', should have taken some elements out of 
context but company managers themselves know that the 
success of the new approach depends on its being properly 
integrated. The point was appreciated by Roy Sanderson, 
N a t i o n a l O f f i c e r of the E l e c t r i c a l , E l e c t r o n i c , 
Telecommunication and Plumbing Union (EETPU), who had 
been involved at an early stage in negotiations concerning the 
new approach. It was his view that, 'You can't have bits of it, 
like reduced manning. It hangs together as a package' 5. 
In a presentation that he gave to a London audience, Mr. 
Komada emphasised that whether an applicant was selected or 
not very much depended on whether he or she was likely to be a 
good team member, as well as competent at the job. In fact two 
of the four 'key principles' guiding the start up of the new 
company were directly concerned with personnel. The four 'key 
principles' 6 were : 
1. To establish a high standard from day one. 
2. To recruit the right people. 
3. To develop employee attitudes. 
4. To develop suppliers' attitudes. 
To symbolise the break with the unsuccessful past that was 
being made, change was made explicit not only by means of the 
company recruitment video but also in such external details as 
the appearance of the plant itself. As one manager put it, 'We 
even painted the floor'. 
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Personnel management and employee relations 
From the beginning, the new company has had a Managing 
Director and a Personnel Director who are both British. Indeed, 
with the exception of Japanese managers in liaison and 
technical advisory positions, including the purchasing of 
components from Japan etc, management has been a local 
responsibility. The number of expatriates has been greatly 
reduced since the time of the start up when, following normal 
practice, a team of Japanese technical advisors was brought 
over to help with training and with setting up the operation. 
Consistent with the aim 'to develop positive employee 
attitudes', mentioned as the second of the four 'key principles' 
guiding the start up above, the actions listed in Table 1 below 
were put into effect. 
Table 1. Actions to develop positive employee attitudes 
a. Careful selection and induction 
b. Autonomy of local management 
c. Open style management and consultation 
d. Five-minute morning meet ings . Monthly 
meetings. Six- monthly business reviews (for all 
personnel) 
e. Few levels of management 
f. Open plan offices 
g. Development of team approach 
h. All on monthly staff with common terms and 
conditions 
i. Single status restaurant 
j . Wearing of (company) coats 
k. Grade promotional opportunities 
1. Total flexibility 
m. Attendance and timekeeping disciplines 
n. No smoking or food in production areas 
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o. Individual responsibili ty for (work) space 
cleaning 
p. Small circle activities 
q. Annual formal performance reviews 
(Source : TCP) 
The 'common terms and conditions' of employment referred 
to in Item h above are often popularly referred to as 'single 
status', and although the expression is not strictly speaking 
correct, it sums up much of the reality of the new approach. 
Whereas in the old days, and still in many other 'traditional' 
firms, there had been hourly paid and monthly paid employees, 
blue collar workers and white collar staff, and separate 
restaurants for managers, supervisors and employees, with 
other overt status differences such as reserved parking spaces 
for 'managers' cars, these distinctions now no longer exist. All 
personnel are plaid in the same way at the same intervals. All 
eat in the same restaurant, which has been designed to meet the 
same standards as good motoray cafeterias. All wear the same 
'company coat'; in other words the same type of blue jacket with 
a small company logo sewn on in red. They wear a name badge, 
with the name by which they as individuals choose to be known, 
but without specifying their department, as it was felt that this 
would be inconsistent with the team approach and reminscent 
of departmentalism. All share the same holiday entitlement. 
The first person to arrive in the car park gets the best place. 
There is one large open plan office for the administration in 
which everyone, including the Managing Director, works side 
by side. The only difference in conditions is naturally the 
amount of salary. 
For managers in particular it was made clear that what 
was aimed at was a 'total team' and that 'if one department 
fails, the total company fails'. In other words, there was to be 
no room for functional barriers, empire building or the 'that's 
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not my job' mentality. The present Personnel Director, for 
example has a training background and does not see himself as 
split off into an isolated or 'separate' function, as some 
qualified 'professionals' tend to do. 
There are four grades of ordinary employee. Among the 
company's 'Major objectives and principles' is 'to reward 
individual employees on the basis of proficiency over a range of 
job skills and the flexibility of their contribution to the 
company'. Flexibility is not merely expressed as a desirable goal 
but is built into the reward system. Eighteen production skills 
are recognised and increments for skills are paid. A formal 
assessment of the individual employee is carried out annually, 
in accordance with Item 2c in Table 2 below. All skills in the 
company are classified under either administration, production 
or key operations and are clearly defined : an echo of the high 
degree of definition at the Glacier Metal Company rather than 
of standard Japanese practice where flexibility and the absence 
of functional barriers are assumed. But operators are 
themselves responsible for their own quality control and the old 
Tayloristic division between specialist quality inspectors, or 
'brain workers' , and ordinary line operators without any 
responsibility for the quality of their work, or 'manual workers', 
no longer exists. 
Discipline on the shop floor includes the prohibition of 
eating, drinking or smoking in production areas but, as in 
factories in Japan, areas for employees on the different lines are 
provided at the side of the line, with chairs and tables, where 
they can drink tea and relax during the breaks. This type of 
discipline is sometimes characterised as 'Japanese', or even 
allegedly typical of the 'disciplined' Japanese nation, but the fact 
is that it is the same discipline that was found in british radio 
factories in the 1930s. In this instance, as in some others, 
Japanese influence has led to the reintroduction of practices 
that were formerly standard and which can be said to constitute 
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sound management, rather than to any particular innovation; 
let alone anything 'exotic'. 
The task orientation of the personnel and production 
systems needs to be remembered when considering the 
participatory and industrial relations aspects of the overall 
management system. At the same t ime the Toshiba 
management deserves the credit for having the vision and 
confidence to accept the new approach, which many British 
managements would probably not have done. Des Thomson, 
the Managing Director after Geoffrey Deith, for example, 
spoke of the need to 'break down traditional attitudes' and to 
create a new style of relations at work. The management team 
discussed every item of policy in detail before proposing its 
adoption and Deith himself presented a selection of company 
coats, or uniform jackets, before a decision on its colour and 
style was reached. Des Thomson saw the wearing of the jacket 
as 'very fundamental - it would define us as different' : 
different, that is to say, from 'traditional' companies witheir 
status distinctions and the tendency for the management to be 
remote from the shopfloor. But not 'different' in the sense of 
being eccentric or out of touch with the social environment in 
which the company operates. The latter point was made explicit 
in the statement of business objectives reproduced in Table 2 
below. 
Table 2. Toshiba Consumer Products (UK) Ltd. Business objectives 
1. To provide products for Toshiba European sales 
companies and independent dealers : 
a. Of the right type 
b. At the right time 
c. At the right cost 
d. At a high level of quality and reliability 
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2. To develop within TCP an industrial culture in 
which all members of the company : 
a. Willingly maximise their personal contri-
bution 
b. Can identify with the objectives of the 
Company 
c. Can develop and grow in personal terms 
d. Feel a joint loyalty to Toshiba as their parent 
company and to TCP as a UK operation 
3. To work in harmony with the Trade Union 
4. To work closely with all suppliers in order to : 
a. Minimise product cost 
b. Maximise product quality 
c. Minimise inventory holding 
5. To maintain within Plymouth a high reputation 
for Toshiba as an employer and as a Company 
which supports the community in which it 
operates 
In Summary 
To generate the highest levels of profit in a 
consistent manner, without deviating from the 
high principles of Toshiba. 
(Source : TCP) 
Even under the joint venture there had been seven union 
bargaining units, representing six unions, although the EETPU 
had the largest membership in the factory. Almost all Japanese 
manufacturing operations in Britain have a union agreement 
and there was never the idea of managing the company on a 
non-union basis, as one or two other Japanese manufacturers in 
the electronics industry are doing. The EETPU was involved in 
discussions from an early stage but while the management were 
prepared to recognise one union for bargaining purposes they 
certainly did not want to encumber themselves with the old type 
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of multi-union bargaining. In this respect, the closure of the old 
company provided a good opportunity for putting union 
relations on a better footing. 
In fact, Toshiba became famous for signing the first of what 
are popularly, if not quite accurately, known as 'single-union, 
no-strike' deals : a type of agreement that has been spreading in 
the UK and which some commentators see as characteristic of 
the 'new industrial relations' in the country which have arisen 
since the defeat of the Labour Party and its excessively union-
friendly policies 7 . The exact details of the agreements vary in 
each case but another prominent example has been that of 
Nissan, which also enjoyed the advantage of starting out on a 
new 'green field' site. But Hitachi, which was unable to close 
down completely and start afresh when it moved from joint 
venture to wholly-owned status, has shown that it is possible to 
change to a single-union agreement without the advantage of a 
'green field' site; even though it is of course more difficult. 
Under the agreement at Plymouth, the EETPU, which had 
80 per cent of the union membership at the time of the joint 
venture, was formally recognised as the sole bargaining 
partner; although employees are free to belong to another 
union or to no union at all if they wish. Because of the recession 
and a certain amount of disillusion with unions and their 
effectiveness in providing practical benefits to their members, 
union membership in the UK has been declining and there is 
keen competition among unions for members. There is also a 
trend towards mergers, in order to create unions with 
numerical strength : something that the EETPU itself may be 
involved in. These reasons make 'single-union' bargaining 
agreements attractive to unions; while for management it also 
becomes easier to get agreement on flexible working practices. 
This is essential in industries such as electronics where fast 
response to changes in markets, technologies and products is 
crucial for survival. On its side, the EETPU has made a 
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speciality of offering flexibility as a strong 'selling point' to 
newly established companies in this type of industry and has 
also canvassed Japanese companies by holding presentations 
detailing what it is prepared to offer at sessions in Japan. 
In October 1986, just five and a half years after the start up 
of the new company, a celebration was held to mark the 
production of Toshiba's millionth British-made TV set. The 
programme for the ceremony contained a message from the 
Managing Director, Des Thomson, stating tha t : 
Annual television production has increased from 
76,000 in 1981 to nearly 400,000 sets today. Toshiba 
C o n s u m e r P r o d u c t s has d ive r s i f i ed i ts 
production... This year the company will produce 
over 1000,000 video cassette recorders... and 
170,000 microwave ovens... The company is proud 
of its achievements but recognises that teamwork 
is the key to success. The co-operation that exists 
be tween English and Japanese , union and 
management, management and non-management 
and production and sales has allowed Toshiba 
Consumer Products to overcome the problems 
associated with rapid growth. 
The Finance Director commented that the company had 
'grown beyond our wildest dreams'. A factor in this growth has 
been industrial peace and the then Chairman of Toshiba in 
Japan, Mr. S. Saba, who attended the celebrations along with 
other senior managers and local dignitaries etc, made a point of 
emphasising that the factory at Plymouth 'had not lost a minute 
because of industrial action'. Mr. Saba then went on to say that, 
'This is the most successful of our manufacturing operations 
outside Japan. Apart from our technology here, the thing I 
appreciate most is the diligent workforce and the good 
management'. Mr. Saba admitted that he had previously been 
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worried about the UK's 'poor reputation for industrial 
relations' but said that these worries had now disappeared and 
that the agreement reached between the company and the 
union had shown that, 'the UK need not have conflict between 
management and unions'. On a previous visit to Plymouth 
shortly after the start up in May 1981, he had spoken to all the 
employees at the end of the working day and, doubtless to 
encourage them and to give them the feeling that they had a 
stake in the new venture, had emphasised what he saw as the 
organic nature of the company and the way in which 
management would be a local responsibility in operational 
matters, as in Item b of Table 1 above. He used some quite 
poetic imagery : 
Toshiba has no intention of ruling over this 
company. The company is yours. It is like a small 
mustard-seed which you took and sowed in your 
garden; it grows to be a tree and the birds come to 
roost among its branches. The future of the 
company rests on your shoulders. Your efforts, and 
nothing else, will make the company prosperous 
and give your family happiness. Toshiba will 
support you in this endeavour, providing you with 
capital and technology. Do your best ! 
It is an unfortunate fact that in many British companies the 
Managing Director, not to mention the Chairman, would be 
unlikely to think that it was important to communicate anything 
about the company to the people working in it. Here again, 
Japanese companies have drawn renewed attention to the issue 
of communication, without which the best results are unlikely to 
be achieved. 
The representative system 
Communication was emphasised among the 'actions to 
develop positive employee attitudes' listed in Table 1 above but, 
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like other parts of the management system, it needs to be seen in 
the context of the new approach as a whole. 
The Company Advisory Board (COAB) is the centrepiece of 
the representat ive system although, as the Industrial 
Participation Association noted, it is at the same time 'one 
element only in a total company employment package' 8. COAB 
originally consisted of ten representatives, elected by secret 
ballot from every level and department of the company, plus the 
senior union representative, who is automatically a member if 
not already elected as a departmental representative. A large 
round table, with no 'top', was specially made and the 
Managing Director is normally the chairman : something 
underlining the seriousness with which the company takes 
COAB. When the new Home Appliance (HA) Division was 
established in 1985 to produce microwave ovens, COAB was 
expanded to include its representatives, since both Divisions 
were under the same umbrella organisation and it was felt that 
a separate COAB would be too small and isolated. 
Representat ives need not be union shops stewards, 
although today many are, on the principle that people should be 
selected on their own merits and not just because they held a 
union position. But it was also recognised that it would be 
important for union shop stewards to attend any meetings 
where the annual pay settlement was under discussion and they 
have the right to do so. 
To ensure that meetings are open and above board, to 
interest potential representatives in COAB and what it does 
and to help to diffuse information, five or six observers may 
attend. These are simply anyone who is interested and are not 
selected in any way. During the job satisfaction study carried 
out in 1987 it was possible to talk to employees who had 
attended meetings as observers and to find that even the most 
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sceptical had been impressed by the openness of the discussion 
and convinced that the meetings were not 'fixed' in advance. 
COAB can discuss, in the words of Geoffrey Deith, 'any 
subject from the size of the Managing Director's car to the 
annual salary review'. The relationship with the union is that of 
'negotiation by advice' in the first instance. If COAB were to fail 
to agree on wages or conditions, then there would be ordinary 
straightforward bargaining between the management and the 
union. 
There is full disclosure of company information, including 
financial and production-related information, to C O A B ; 
without which it would be unlikely either to have credibility 
with employees or be able to function effectively. Of course, 
merely providing information about exchange rate fluctuations 
or production targets, for instance, could degenerate into 
something mechanical unless there are efforts to explain what 
it means in real terms for the prospects of the company and the 
job security and earnings of those who work in it. So the 
management has put a lot of time and effort into discussing 
with COAB representatives what the figures mean and into 
explaining them to the whole of the workforce at the six-
monthly performance reviews. In addition, there are the five-
minute meetings at the beginning of work, which are really for 
briefing about operational matters such as production runs, 
targets and what problems to look out for, COAB itself meets 
regularly at least once a month. 
It needs to be stressed that COAB is an advisory body and 
that ultimate responsibility for the progress of the company 
resides with the Board but its recommendations are taken 
seriously by the management. This can be verified by looking at 
the record of recommendations accepted, which there is 
unfortunately no space to go into here. Attendance at a COAB 
meeting also provided an opportunity to see how seriously it is 
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taken by the elected members, who do not waste time with 
trivia. The senior shop steward commented that it is, 'Not all 
sweetness and light, but it is honest, durable, and it works'. 
Anything, apart from individual cases that should be taken up in 
the normal way in the department, can be put on the agenda by 
any member. 
Feedback to all employees was originally provided by 
videotapes, which were made available for the Policy Studies 
Institute study and which are quoted in the book, but this was 
felt to lack the participatory element. One can not ask a tape 
questions or discuss with it. So the practice was dropped in 
favour of feeding back information after COAB meetings 
directly to employees at the regular five-minute morning 
meetings. This helps to ensure that the whole workforce is kept 
up to date with what is going on and that no one is left out. 
So far, COAB has been able to settle all matters raised, 
including wage negotiations, without recourse to the final stage 
of the agreed procedure. If management-union negotiation, the 
second stage of the advisory system, were to fail then there is 
provision for an issue to go forward to a third and final stage. 
This is 'pendulum' arbitration, which both management and 
union have agreed is binding. 'Pendulum' arbitration means 
that the arbitrator, an independent person brought in from 
outside, must settle either wholly for one party or wholly for the 
other. The arbitrator is not allowed to settle in the middle 
between the two positions, or to 'split the difference' as 
'traditional' arbitration allows for. The idea is to encourage 
both parties to moderate their demands, thus making it easier 
to reach a settlement. 
It is of interest that this system is American, not Japanese, 
and that its provision was suggested by the National Officer of 
the EETPU, who had learned about it while visiting the United 
States. Indeed COAB itself has its roots in the Glacier Metal 
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Company case and in Geoffrey Deith's previous experience in 
running such a body and is not usual in companies in Japan. 
British industrial relations still have a 'voluntarist' base, 
although there is now more industrial relations legislation in 
force, concerning strike ballots and secondary action for 
example, that there was a few years ago. But there are not the 
legally enforceable contracts of the American system, the 
institutionalised arrangements of the German system of co-
determination or the same role for the state and its organs that 
there is in many Continental countries. The expression 
'no-strike agreement ' is therefore a piece of convenient 
shorthand rather than a strictly accurate technical term. It 
seems unlikely that employees would be unlikely to be deterred 
by a piece of paper if management had allowed the situation to 
deteriorate to such an extent. But there is no evidence to 
suggest that the representative system at Toshiba, through the 
effectiveness of COAB, would allow the situation to get to this 
point. 
The importance of the suppliers 
The last of the four 'key principles' guiding the start up, 
quoted above, was 'to develop suppliers attitudes' : something 
unusual in a company policy statement of this type. 
The initiative was taken by Geoffrey Deith, who held the 
first of the suppliers' conferences at a hotel not far from 
London. It was attended by the representatives of 150 suppliers. 
Deith's purpose was to explain 'what we would expect of a 
supplier, what the systems would look like and the enthusiasm 
and maximum expected'. 
All companies like Toshiba in Japan have their own 
associations for suppliers and sub-contractors. There are 
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regular monthly meetings and continual close contact between 
manufacturer and supplier. The interest of both parties in long-
term relations that foster mutually profitable development 
work is taken for granted; but in Britain, with a few exceptions, 
such a level of cooperation is rare. Japanese customer 
companies vet their new suppliers with great care before 
deciding whether to take them on or not and they make 
exacting demands on them; but they also provide technical 
assistance, the loan of sophisticated machines and equipment 
and management support. A number of employees in Japan 
from the medium and small enterprise sector, from which many 
suppliers come, can be found as trainees in the customer 
companies, where they naturally learn what the customer 
wants. Equally, if a supplier gets into difficulties, the customer 
company may second managers to it in order to get it back on 
the rails again. These concerted efforts to ensure that suppliers 
can produce components of the right quality, at the right price, 
delivered on time bring obvious competitive benefits to the 
customer companies. Having once decided to work with a 
supplier, they are anxious not to waste their investment of time, 
effort and prestige and will only dismiss a supplier if it finally 
shows that it is unable to improve in spite of being both helped 
and warned. It is a system that benefits both customers and 
suppliers, since it helps all of them to become more competitive, 
particularly by making the type of cost savings that can only be 
produced in the long run : never in the short run. What incentive 
does a supplier have to invest unless he can be reasonably 
confident of a stable relationship with the customer ? 
For Toshiba at Plymouth, it was clear that the reliable 
supply of components of consistent quality and suitable price 
was an essential link in the chain of the TV production system; 
and that relations with suppliers for a new company whose 
object was to integrate and upgrade its operations could have a 
decided effect on performance. There would, after all, be little 
point in putting a great deal of effort into ensuring that the 
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workforce was well informed, well motivated and well trained 
if production were to be halted by shortages of components; and 
warehousing to keep components 'just in case' suppliers ' 
deliveries were unreliable would be a waste of money in any 
case. A year after its start up therefore TCP began its policy of 
visits by suppliers' employees to the Plymouth factory, so that 
they could learn at first hand from TCP operators what the 
requirements were and what problems would be caused by late 
or incorrect deliveries : something unheard of in 'traditional' 
British companies . Suppliers were also invited to the 
celebration of the millionth TV and one, who has 90 per cent of 
his business with Japanese firms, travelled over from Ireland. 
Initially, TCP suffered shortages in the numbers of 
components delivered by local suppliers. It felt the problem was 
serious enough to involve the entire personnel of the factory, 
from the Finance Director (!) to shop floor operators in 
physically counting one and a half million components. As Des 
Thomson pointed out, counting is something that everyone can 
do and it made everyone aware of the problem and that its 
solution was crucial to the success of the enterprise as a whole : 
it was not 'just a procurement matter'. This commitment has 
gradually paid off and there has been the gradual change in 
suppliers' attitudes and performance that was aimed at. 
From the Japanese point of view, the two major problems 
involved in manufacturing in Europe are employee or industrial 
relations and finding good local suppliers who are willing and 
able to provide the level of service that they require. The former 
is not perhaps surprising but the latter has received far less 
attention; even though it has been consistently referred to in the 
annual reports on the state of Japanese manufacturing in 
Europe, now produced in English by the Japan External Trade 
Organisation (JETRO). Such reports give an important insight 
into the priorities of Japanese manufacturers 9. 
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Toshiba as a model ? 
Between 1981 and 1987 the company grew to nearly four 
times its original size. The proportion of products coming off 
the line 'right first time' rose from 60 per cent to 93 per cent. 
Output per person increased from 93 to 250. New products -
video tape recorders and microwave ovens - and a new 
Division were added to the operation. There was substantial 
growth in sales and market share (the exact figures were made 
available for the study but can not be reproduced because of 
business confidentiality) and no time was lost because of 
industrial disputes. These data indicate the success of the new 
approach and, in addition, a number of Japanese and other 
companies in the UK have established employee relations 
systems that follow the Toshiba example. Hitachi, for instance, 
has a 'company members ' board', Sanyo has 'pendulum' 
arbitration and, in an industry that since the war has 
experienced considerably more difficulty than consumer 
electronics, Nissan has introduced a 'package' of measures 
aimed at the same type of integrated approach as Toshiba's 1 0 . 
The problems at Toshiba - and managers are modest in 
insisting that what they have is not a panacea or some kind of 
'patent medicine' guaranteed to cure all ills - are those 
connected with this type of industry and with growth and 
success. Assembling TV sets, VTRs or microwave ovens 
inevitably involves repetitive work that has limited intrinsic 
interest and a challenge for all managements in this field is how 
to introduce measures, such as job rotation and small circle 
activities, to make it more interesting. The pressure to produce 
to keep up with the demands of a very competitive market 
l ikewise causes stress and again it is a challenge for 
management to see that the human side of managing a 
company gets enough attention when time is short. Growth has 
also meant a change from a relatively small , close-knit 
organisation, in which there was a camaraderie brought about 
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by the trauma of the collapse of the old company, to a larger 
organisation, in which the longer-serving and somewhat older 
members of the firm are outnumbered by newer, younger 
employees , who tend to take the improvements and 
innovations, such as 'single status', for granted. The full-length 
book on TCP gives the findings from the 1987 interviews and job 
satisfaction survey. 
TCP may not be Utopia, and none of its managers would 
claim that it was, but it is a vast improvement on 'traditional' 
British companies : a fact particularly appreciated by the older 
employees with the actual experience of having worked in one. 
Equally, every company's situation and personnel are different, 
and there is no slick formula that can apply to large companies, 
small companies , manufacturing companies , sales and 
distribution companies, financial institutions etc. But it is 
nevertheless possible to point to certain features of the Toshiba 
experience that managers of other companies facing the same 
type of problems that TCP faced initially could profitably study. 
It would of course be possible to make a long list of all the 
factors underlying the successful implementation of the new 
approach but four, mutually supportive, factors stand out. They 
are : 
1. Vision (where does the company want to go and 
how will it get there ?) 
2. Leadership (active and forward-looking, not 
bureaucratic) 
3. Pragmatism (the method by which TCP arrived 
at its new approach, aimed at achieving its 
objectives) 
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4. The right people (careful selection of the 
management team, who would actively support 
the new approach : building an organisation of 
employees of the right type, who would be 
motivated towards high quality performance). 
If any one of these factors is lacking, the attempt to 
innovate will be flawed, because it will not be properly 
integrated. 
Analysis 
Any of the practices successfully used by Japanese 
companies and of their implications for British companies, 
carried out by the heads of training and personnel respectively 
in companies belonging to an international group, did not 
recommand an unthinking imitation of Japanese practices but it 
did identify five significant areas into which British companies 
could put an effort if they wanted to get 'the kind of employee 
response' that had been of such great benefit to Japanese 
companies 1 1 . The areas were : 
1. Security of employment (TCP's 'established 
members', after a probationary period and two 
years service) 
2. Common employment condi t ions ( 'single 
status') 
3. Training (flexibility, grading scheme) 
4. Communication and employee involvement 
(meetings, COAB) 
5. 'Local focus' of industrial relations (COAB, 
' s i n g l e - u n i o n ' a g r e e m e n t , ' p e n d u l u m 
arbitration). 
To a greater or lesser extent, all five areas feature in the 
management systems of TCP and other manufacturers in 
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Britain. The TCP case and others like it show that when the 
company structure, the production system and arrangements 
with suppliers etc. are no longer able to respond to current 
needs, then piecemeal attempts to patch up the system will not 
work. A new approach, involving employee relations, the 
different aspects of production and marketing that were 
outlined above and supplier relations is needed - and it must be 
integrated and thoroughgoing 'from day one'. 
That is probably the most important conclusion for 
managers and policy makers to draw from Toshiba's experience 
at Plymouth. 
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R E S U M E 
Le chiffre d'affaires de Toshiba Consumer Products (UK) 
Ltd a quadruplé de 1981 à 1987. La productivité a sensiblement 
augmenté et la gamme des produits a été élargie. La gestion de 
TCP n'est sûrement pas parfaite mais elle montre une nette 
amélioration par rapport à celle adoptée par les firmes 
britanniques traditionnelles. Il est très difficile de généraliser et 
aucune formule ne peut s'appliquer indifféremment à de 
grandes entreprises, à des petites, à des fabricants ou à des 
firmes de distribution. Cependant, il est possible de tirer de 
l'expérience de Toshiba des enseignements profitables aux 
managers d'autres entreprises ayant à faire face aux mêmes 
problèmes. 
Il ne s'est pas agi de l'imitation indiscriminée de méthodes 
japonaises mais de l'identification de points sur lesquels les 
managers européens devraient réfléchir pour obtenir du 
personnel, la motivation qui a tant profité aux entreprises 
japonaises. 
